recently re-introduced a paradigm to study the creation of false memories. Subjects hear short lists of related words (e.g., thread, pin, eye, sewing, etc.), all of which are associates of a critical nonpresented word (e.g., needle); on a free recall test given immediately after list presentation, subjects often erroneously recall the critical nonpresented word. The experiments reported here explore (a) the effect of test delay on false recall and (b) whether multiple study/test opportunities reduce the proportion of critical items erroneously recalled. In Experiment 1, introduction of a 2-day delay between study and test produced probabilities of false recall that exceeded those of veridical recall. In addition, prior testing of the list enhanced false recall, much like testing enhances later recall of studied items (the testing effect). In Experiment 2, an attempt was made to reduce or eliminate the false recall effect by using a multitrial study/test procedure. Although subjects were able to reduce the proportion of critical nonpresented words erroneously recalled, they were unable to eliminate the false recall effect, even after 5 study-test trials. An interaction occurred between accurate and false recall as a function of retention interval: after a one-day delay, false recall levels rose, whereas accurate recall decreased. Results of both experiments demonstrate the persistence of this memory illusion.
Investigation into the constructive (or in-Bartlett then administered a free recall test to his subjects and found that they tended to ferential) nature of recall was pioneered by produce distortions in line with their cultural Bartlett (1932) , and most of the subsequent expectations (but see Gauld, & Stephenson research on this topic has been guided by 1967, for questions regarding the nature of his procedural choices and theoretical asserBartlett's test instructions). Bartlett contions. Bartlett chose for his study material a cluded that remembering involves reconcomplex Indian folktale containing culturstruction of the past in light of our underally bound elements of the supernatural that standing of the world (i.e., our schemas). were unfamiliar to his English subjects.
Most memory researchers preceding Bartlett had chosen word lists or nonsense syllaThis research was supported by a research grant from bles as their study material. Bartlett argued Sigma Xi to Kathleen McDermott and by Grant F49620-that this approach was too restrictive, claiming 92-J-0437 from the Air Force Office of Scientific that it promotes rote memorization, or repro-there seems to have been a general acceptance Deese's paradigm as a way of studying false recall and false recognition. In one experiment of the idea that traditional list learning procedures do not allow for constructive memory (Roediger & McDermott, 1995, Experiment 2), we presented subjects with 15-word lists, processes; most researchers studying constructive memory have chosen sentences which were constructed in the same manner as those used by Deese. After each of the lists, (Bransford & Franks, 1971) , stories (Sulin & Dooling, 1974) , slide sequences (Loftus, subjects were instructed either to recall the list or to do math problems. For the lists that were Miller, & Burns, 1978) , or videotapes (Loftus & Palmer, 1974) as their materials (but recalled, subjects accurately produced 62% of the words they had studied; 55% of the time see Underwood, 1965 , for an exception). However, there has been a general departure they also produced the critical nonpresented item. The critical nonpresented item was refrom a different aspect of Bartlett's procedure in that recognition, not free recall, has been called at a level comparable to the words in the middle serial positions (usually assumed the test of choice. This trend is probably attributable to a general difficulty in obtaining in-to reflect retrieval from long-term store). This high intrusion level is very unusual given that trusions on free recall tests; this difficulty is magnified on tests given shortly after the study (1) the materials used were word lists, which are generally thought to discourage construcepisode (Cofer, 1967; Roediger & Payne, 1985; Spiro, 1980) . tive processes; (2) the lists were very short; (3) the test was a free recall test, which is There is one generally overlooked exception to both of these procedural trends, in usually resistant to intrusive errors; (4) the test was given immediately after list presentation; which striking memory illusions were produced in a simple, list-learning paradigm on and (5) subjects were explicitly instructed not to guess. an immediate free recall test. Deese (1959) presented subjects with lists composed of In addition, Roediger and McDermott (1995) used a final recognition test to examine words associated to a critical, nonpresented word (e.g., thread, pin, eye, sewing, sharp, other aspects of false memories in this paradigm and obtained remarkably high false point, prick, thimble, haystack, thorn, hurt, injection , which are all associated to needle). alarm rates for the critical lures (.81 for the lists that had been followed by recall tests and Presentation of each list was followed immediately by a free recall test. Deese found that .72 for the lists presented but not followed by initial tests). These rates were virtually identifor some lists, subjects erroneously recalled the critical nonpresented word. Although the cal to the hit rates (.79 for the lists recalled previously and .65 for the lists not previously lists were constructed from word association norms by obtaining forward associates to the tested). Note too that a testing effect was obtained both for veridical recognition and false critical items (i.e., words elicited by the critical nonpresented words on a free association recognition: Recognition rates were higher for studied items and lures for lists that had been task), Deese hypothesized that backward associations (i.e., associations from the list words previously tested than for lists not previously tested. Finally, when Tulving's (1985) rememto the critical word) were crucial in producing the false recall effect. A correlational analysis ber/know procedure was employed, subjects often claimed to remember vividly some speof his results confirmed this prediction; the mean probability with which list items elicited cific aspect of the presentation of the critical items; indeed, they made this claim as often the critical item on a free association test correlated .87 with the probability of obtaining for the critical nonpresented items as they did for items actually studied. Thus, Deese's an intrusion of the critical nonpresented item for that list.
(1959) paradigm provides a powerful method by which to study illusory memories both in Roediger and McDermott (1995) adopted recall and recognition. Read (1996) , Payne, effect in single trial free recall, thereby attenuating overall levels of recall (Glanzer & CuElie, Blackwell, and Neuschatz (1996 ), and Schacter, Verfaellie, and Pradere (1996 ) have nitz, 1966 Postman & Phillips, 1965) . Experiment 1 addressed the question of how such a recently conducted similar experiments with this paradigm.
delay might affect recall of the critical nonpresented word. Subjects were presented with 24 The present experiments were designed to follow up those of Roediger and McDermott lists; after each of 8 lists they received an (1995) by examining some basic questions immediate free recall test, after each of 8 lists about the persistence of illusory memories they received a free recall test delayed by 30 in this paradigm. In Experiment 1, I exam-s, and after each of 8 lists they took no initial ined the effect of test delay on false recall. test. Two types of delay were examined: (1) a A final free recall test covering all 24 lists short (30 s) filled delay and (2) a longer, 2-was given 2 days later to examine false recall day delay. Firm predictions could be made after a substantially longer delay. There is for studied items in all conditions, with in-some evidence in the prose memory literature creasing delays adversely affecting perfor-to suggest that false recall might actually inmance; the primary question was how false crease over long delays; however, the pararecall would behave relative to veridical re-digm used here is quite different from the call as a function of delay.
prose recognition and recall paradigms used Experiment 2 explored the persistence of previously. Sulin and Dooling (1974) found these illusory memories by employing a false recognition of schema-consistent prose multitrial free recall paradigm to determine passages to increase over an interval of 5 min whether subjects could eventually, after multi-to 1 week. The authors interpreted this result ple study/test trials, edit out their intrusions. as being consistent with Bartlett's (1932) conSubjects were given 5 presentations of a list, ception of remembering, which holds that with a recall test following each presentation. memory for specific details of an event decays A final free recall test followed 1 day later. over time, whereas schema-consistent inforKay (1955; see also Howe, 1970 ) asked a sim-mation remains relatively intact (see too ilar question; he presented subjects with prose Posner & Keele, 1970) . Spiro (1980) used passages and then tested them after a short (5 prose passages to examine the effect of delay min) delay. Following the test, he re-presented on false recall and found that in certain condithe material, waited 1 week, tested subjects tions false recall increased from 2 days to 3 again, and re-presented the material. This se-weeks. quence was carried out until six recall tests This 2-day delay condition also allowed for had occurred. Kay found that subjects had an assessment of whether any differences great difficulty editing out intrusions, despite found between the initial test conditions (an the fact that they had encountered the original, immediate test or a test given after a short, correct material more recently than their erro-filled delay) might be carried over onto a final neous recall.
free recall test given much later. In addition, In summary, the goal of the present experi-the final free recall test permitted an assessments was to examine constructive processes ment of whether the act of recall on Day 1 in recall. Specifically, I was interested in ex-would influence recall levels 2 days later. In amining the persistence of false recall in com-other words, would recall of items from the parison to accurate recall over delays and over lists that had been tested on Day 1 differ from multiple trials.
recall of those not initially tested? Evidence EXPERIMENT 1 from the literature on the testing effect suggests a positive effect of testing would occur For studied items, introduction of a filled delay as short as 30 s eliminates the recency for studied items (e.g., Wheeler & Roediger, 1992; see Roediger & Guynn, in press, for a ally or in groups of four or fewer. They were seated at tables with the two stacks of paper review). The interesting question was whether such an effect might also occur in recall of in front of them. They were told that the purpose of the experiment was to examine the critical items. Roediger and McDermott (1995) obtained a testing effect for critical relation between their memory and math abilities. It was explained that they would hear a lures (e.g., needle) on a recognition test given immediately after study of all the lists, but series of lists (24 in all) presented via the tape player and that they should pay close attention Payne et al. (1996) and Schacter et al. (1996) failed to replicate this outcome. The question to the lists because after some lists their memory would be tested. here was whether such a testing effect would be found on a final free recall test given after Following presentation of each list, subjects either (1) Design. The nature of the initial test was 30 s and then were asked to do an additional 90 s of math problems). There were always 2 manipulated in three within-subjects conditions (Immediate, Delayed, and No Test) . min between list presentations, and subjects never knew until after a list had been preTwenty-four study lists were divided arbitrarily (with the stipulation that intrusion rates sented whether they would first recall it or do math problems. Furthermore, when a list was obtained in previous experiments were approximately equivalent across sets) into three followed initially by math problems, subjects did not know until the end of the math period sets of eight lists for purposes of counterbalancing. Across subjects, each set (and there-whether they would then be asked to do more math problems or to recall the list. fore each list) was assigned to each condition equally often.
Instructions given to subjects were designed to disguise the fact that the math problems Materials. Twenty-four lists of 15 items each were used for this experiment; they were were included only to instantiate three test conditions (Immediate, Delayed, and None) the same lists as those reported in the Appendix of Roediger and McDermott's (1995) arti-in hopes that subjects would take the math problems seriously (and thereby not rehearse cle. There was no overlap in words across lists, and no critical items appeared in any the list in the delayed condition) and that they would not realize that a final test would be list. Ordering of words within lists was held constant, and the words most strongly associ-given when they returned 2 days later.
Subjects were informed that they would ated with the critical items generally occurred toward the beginning of the lists.
perform two tasks after presentation of each list. They were told that immediately after list Lists were presented on a tape recorder in a male voice at a rate of approximately 1.5 s. presentation, the experimenter would say ''recall'' or ''math'' to indicate what should be Because all subjects heard all lists, only one tape was necessary. Initial test condition oc-done. When the experimenter said ''recall,'' subjects were to take one of the lined sheets curred in a mixed fashion.
Subjects were provided with two stacks of in front of them and write down as many words as they could remember from the im-4Љ 1 11Љ sheets of paper; one stack contained lined sheets for recall, and one contained mediately preceding list. The experimenter stressed that although the object was to resheets with math problems.
Procedure. Subjects were tested individu-member as many words as possible, subjects then do math, or do math and then recall; furthermore, they were told that sometimes they would be asked to do math problems twice in a row or to recall twice (this latter amining the table. First, although a short, filled delay attenuated the level of veridical recall condition never actually occurred). It was stressed to the subjects that the experimenter (compared to the immediate test condition), the delay had no effect on the recall level would always tell them what they should be doing and when to do it. Questions were solic-of the critical items. For studied items, the difference in recall proportions in the immediited and answered.
Upon completion of the last list and its cor-ate condition (.58) and delayed condition (.50) was reliable, t(44) Å 7.71, SEM Å .009. As responding test and/or math periods, subjects were dismissed for the day and reminded to shown in the serial position curve of Fig. 1 , this difference was localized in the last few return 2 days later for a further, unspecified experiment.
items presented. That is, the 30-s filled delay eliminated the recency effect for studied When they returned, subjects were given lined sheets of paper (with 200 lines per sub-items, replicating prior research (Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966; Postman & Phillips, 1965) . ject) and asked to recall all the words they could remember from the first session. They Although robust levels of false recall were obtained in both conditions, there was no reliwere asked to recall as many words as possible, regardless of whether the list (or the indi-able difference between the conditions; the critical items were produced 44% of the time vidual word) had been recalled on the first day. As in the first session, they were asked on the immediate test and 46% on the delayed test, t(44) õ 1. The mean proportion of critical to be certain that every word they wrote down had occurred on the tape player. They were items recalled (collapsing across conditions) is represented in Fig. 1 as the dotted line. given 15 min to perform the task; after each minute, a tone sounded on a computer, signal-(Note that the serial position designation is meaningless for these items because they were ing them to draw a line under the last item recalled and to continue attempting to recall never presented.) As apparent in Fig. 1 , subjects recalled the critical nonstudied words until the session was over.
with a probability comparable to recall of Results and Discussion items presented in the middle portion of the list, which is usually thought to represent reInitial tests. Mean proportions of studied and critical nonstudied items recalled on the call from long-term memory (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; Glanzer & Cunitz, 1966) . initial tests are shown in the left half of Table  1 . Several observations can be made from exThere was a significant interaction between the test conditions and item type, F(1,44) Å emerging from these data is that when the critical nonpresented item is produced on an 5.63, MSE Å .02. As discussed above, delaying the initial test affected production lev-immediate free recall test, it tends to appear toward the end of subjects' output. els of list items but not critical intrusions. Another way of looking at the interaction is that An examination of the output position data for the 30-s delayed test shows a differon the immediate test, accurate recall exceeded false recall, t(44) Å 3.26, SEM Å .04, ent pattern of results. When the cumulative proportion recalled is plotted against output but after a short delay, the probabilities of false and accurate recall were not significantly quintile, the resulting function is almost perfectly linear, as shown in Fig. 2 . This finding different, t(44) Å 1.07, SEM Å .045. Roediger and McDermott (1995) reported indicates that critical items did not occur disproportionately in any particular section that on an immediate test, when the critical items were produced, they tended to occur of the output protocols. The mean output position was 4.9 (of 8.6 items produced on toward the end of the subjects' output for the list: 63% of the time they occurred in the last these tests), or 57% of the way through the subjects' output. fifth of subjects' output. An identical analysis for the immediate condition in the present ex-
The discrepancy between immediate and delayed tests makes sense if one assumes that a periment showed similar, but less dramatic results: 38% of the critical items occurred in the major factor contributing to the late occurrence of critical intrusions found on the immediate test last fifth of subjects' recall protocols. For the lists on which the critical item was recalled, is that subjects begin their recall by producing the items in primary memory, those presented the mean recall position was 6.2 (of 9.6 items written down), or 65% of the way through at the end of the list. This recall strategy allows little chance for the critical item to appear in the their output. Figure 2 shows cumulative proportions recalled as a function of output first part of the recall protocol. When a 30-s filled delay is introduced, and primary memory quintiles for the immediate and delayed conditions of this experiment. The basic finding is removed from subjects' recall, more freedom is permitted in the output position of the critical critical items occurred when they were produced showed that they generally occurred tononpresented item.
An analysis of subjects' errors showed that ward the end of the output for the immediate recall condition (replicating Roediger & Mcthe critical nonpresented items were not the only items falsely recalled by subjects. How-Dermott, 1995) but appeared equally distributed throughout the recall protocols for the ever, of all possible words, subjects intruded an average of only .22 items per list on the delayed condition. Finally, intrusions other than the critical nonpresented items occurred immediate tests and .32 items per list on the delayed test. That is, subjects produced an infrequently, indicating that subjects were not simply guessing or free associating during the item that was neither a studied word nor the critical nonpresented word on about every recall period, thereby following their instructions not to guess. fifth list on the immediate tests and on every third list on the delayed test. This difference Final test. Results from the final free recall test (given 2 days later) are reported on the was reliable, t(44) Å 2.8, SEM Å .036. In general, the intrusions were semantic associ-right side of Table 1 . The overall proportions of studied items and critical items recalled on ates of the presented words. Occasionally, however, subjects wrote a word phonetically this test were lower than on the initial tests.
However, caution should be used when maksimilar to a presented item.
In summary, results on the initial tests ing this comparison because the tests differed not only in delay but also in that in the first showed robust levels of false recall, replicating Roediger and McDermott (1995) . Further-session, an initial test was given after presentation of each of the lists, whereas 2 days later, more, there was no effect of a short, filled delay on levels of false recall. However, the the test was a final free recall test covering all previously presented lists. Therefore, no direct standard finding that such a delay attenuates accurate recall by eliminating the recency ef-comparisons are made between the data for the two test sessions. fect was obtained. An analysis of where the Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the It is clear from this figure that false recall proportions exceeded veridical recall proporfinal free recall data is that the overall proportion of critical items recalled (M Å .20) ex-tions in all conditions for almost all serial positions. Recall that Fig. 1 showed that the ceeded the proportion of studied items recalled (M Å .12). A 3 (Initial Test) 1 2 (Item probability of false recall approximated the probability of recall of items that had been type) within-subjects ANOVA showed this main effect to be significant, F(1,44) Å 21.28, presented in the middle portion of the lists. Figure 3 shows that by 2 days later, on a final MSE Å .02. The test condition of Day 1 also exerted a significant effect on later recall, free recall test, critical items no longer behave as if they had been presented in the middle F(2,88) Å 42.56, MSE Å .01. There was no reliable interaction between test condition and portion of the list; instead, they are recalled at levels comparable to the primacy portion item type, F(2,88) õ 1, indicating that studied items and critical items behaved similarly as of the curve. It is unclear from this experiment how much of this change in relative recall a function of prior testing history: Regardless of whether the lists had been tested immedi-levels is attributable to the test delay and how much to the difference in the tests (final free ately after presentation, after a 30-s delay, or not at all, the proportion of list items recalled recall covering all the lists, instead of recall of each individual list). Nevertheless, recall of 2 days later was lower than the proportion of critical intrusions.
the critical nonpresented items differs from recall of items in the middle of the lists. Planned comparisons showed that for studied items, subjects recalled more items when Depicted in Fig. 4 are the cumulative recall curves for both studied items and critical nonthey had previously taken an immediate test than when the initial test had been delayed, presented items. This graph shows the cumulative probability of recalling the items plotted for t(44) Å 2.06, SEM Å .012. However, for critical items, there was no difference in recall the end of each minute of the final free recall test. The first thing to note from this figure is between the immediate and delayed conditions, t(44) õ 1. In addition, the immediate that the critical items were recalled throughout the recall period, not just toward the end. In and delayed conditions combined produced greater recall probabilities later than did the addition, the proportion of critical nonpresented items recalled is increasing more rapidly than no test condition for both studied items, t(44) Å 10.59, SEM Å .01, and critical items, t(44) the proportion of studied items recalled, F(14,616) Å 13.32, MSE Å .01. Because one Å 5.18, SEM Å .02. Thus, the standard benefit from prior testing-the testing effect-was could argue that the interaction might simply be caused by the main effect of item type combined obtained for studied items; more interestingly, the same effect occurred for critical nonpre-with a floor effect in the first couple minutes of the recall period, an analysis of the last 8 min sented items.
It is informative to examine the serial posi-of the recall period was performed. The item type 1 minute interaction for this section of the tion functions in final free recall as a function of the three initial test conditions, as shown curve was also reliable, F(7,308) Å 4.70, MSE Å .00, providing further evidence that the recall in Fig. 3 . Because overall recall levels were low (and therefore noisy across serial posi-curve for critical items is diverging from that for studied items. A final observation derived tions), this curve has been smoothed by averaging three successive points to obtain each from this figure is that recall of neither type of item had reached asymptote by the end of the point (except the first and the last). For instance, the mean of the second, third, and 15-min recall period, indicating that if subjects had been allowed more recall time, they would fourth positions is represented in the figure as the third position. The first and last positions have recalled more of both types of items.
Finally, an examination of noncritical exin the graph, however, are based on raw data. tralist intrusions revealed that on average, subIn sum, results on the final free recall test of Experiment 1 demonstrate the robustness jects produced 3.5 such items on their final free recall test. Therefore, after studying 24 of false recall in this paradigm. Indeed, after 2 days, the proportion of critical nonpresented lists, 2 days later they correctly recalled an average of 44.4 (of 360 possible) words, pro-items recalled exceeded the proportion of studied items recalled. In addition, the experiduced 4.7 (of 24 possible) critical intrusions, and produced 3.5 other intrusions (out of all ment confirms the critical role of testing in determining later false recall. other English words). EXPERIMENT 2 this analysis, the theme is easier to perceive in the blocked case. Therefore, as stated above, this Experiment 2 was designed to determine variable was an exploratory one. An additional whether this sort of false recall could be atten-question was whether any blocked/random efuated or eliminated across multiple study/test fect (or lack thereof ) for critical items would trials. Because correct recall would have ap-change across trials. proached ceiling quickly using only 15 words
The primary question of the experiment was per list, three 15-word associative sets were whether the proportion of critical items represented in each study list. That is, subjects called would decrease or disappear across tristudied one long list of 45 words, which con-als. A plausible hypothesis was that a decrease sisted of three groups of 15 associates (e.g., would occur because as subjects continue to hot, snow, warm . . . bed, rest, awake . . . learn the items present in the list, they may thread, pin, eye . . .). Items occurred blocked also learn the items not present (or conspicuby associative set for half the subjects and in ous in their absence). For example, subjects a random order for the other half.
may produce a critical nonpresented word on a Assuming that these lists function like catego-first test but be unsure whether it had actually rized lists, previous research would indicate that occurred. They could check for this word durfor the studied items, there should be a main ing the second presentation. Another interesteffect for ordering, with blocked lists producing ing possibility was that if subjects recalled a higher levels of recall than randomly ordered critical item once, they might continue to relists (Dallett, 1964) . One question addressed in call it, carrying over their error despite rethis experiment was whether there would also peated study opportunities. Recall that Kay be an effect of the blocked/random variable for (1955) reported this pattern in recall of prose critical nonpresented items. No firm predictions passages. (His general finding was later replicould be made for this variable because a plausi-cated by Howe (1970) and extended to false ble rationale exists for predicting an effect in recognition (Howe, 1972) .) either direction. It could be that in trying to Kay (1955) used long (i.e., 1 week) delays remember the list items (during either encoding between successive re-presentations of the or retrieval or both), subjects would try to cate-passage and the test phases. He assumed long gorize and organize the lists according to com-delays were necessary to minimize the influmon themes within the lists. Obviously, the ence of the intervening study episodes, ''common themes'' may be represented by the thereby allowing intrusions to persist across critical nonpresented items. Because items from test trials despite the opportunity to reencounthe same ''theme'' are scattered throughout the ter the study material. Because the false recall list in the case of random presentation, subjects effect on immediate tests is very robust with might be more confused about which specific the paradigm used here, I decided to give the items occurred on the random lists than on the tests immediately following list re-presentablocked lists. If so, they might be expected to tion to determine whether the intrusions might intrude the critical nonpresented words more of-persist even under conditions that seem likely ten in random than in blocked lists. Conversely, to promote their disappearance. one could argue that blocked presentation Method should produce higher false recall levels than random presentation because blocking words Subjects. Forty Rice University students might encourage more relational processing of participated in this experiment in exchange for the words and therefore be more likely to elicit course credit or pay. the critical word as an implicit associative reDesign. A 2 (Ordering: Blocked, Random) sponse (Underwood, 1965) or to induce subjects 1 6 (Test Session: Trials 1-5, Day 2) 1 2 (Item Type: Studied, Critical) mixed design to assume that the word had been presented. In was used, with ordering of lists occurring be-call test. They were told that they would hear the same list every time and that the ordering tween subjects and the other two variables instantiated within subjects.
of words within the list would remain constant. They were told to recall the list by writMaterials. Six of the 15-word lists used in Roediger and McDermott's (1995, Experi-ing down as many words as they could remember with the stipulation that they were to ment 2) report were selected on the basis of their producing relatively high levels of recall be confident that every word they wrote had been present in the list. They were given 4 of the critical items. This lists were divided into two 45-word lists of three 15-word asso-min in which to recall the list, and the end of the recall period was indicated by a tone on ciative sets per list. One list contained associates of the 3 critical items cold, sleep, and the computer. At this time, subjects turned over their test sheet and waited for the next needle, and the other list contained associates of fruit, chair, and mountain. Each subject presentation. Questions were answered, and list presentation was begun. received one 45-word list. Items within lists occurred in a fixed order, and the same order Upon returning 1 day later, subjects were instructed to recall as many items as possible was used on all five study presentations. For lists presented in a blocked fashion, sets of from the list they had learned in the previous session. As on the initial tests, they were exassociates were arbitrarily assigned to positions within the list. For lists presented ran-plicitly warned against guessing. Subjects were given 12 min in which to recall, and a domly, items were randomly assigned to 45 positions within the list with the stipulation tone sounded on the computer every minute, signaling subjects to draw a line under the last that no more than three items from one associative set could occur in succession.
item recalled and continue to try to remember more items. Questions were answered, and the For example, in the blocked condition, one list contained the 15 associates to cold, fol-recall period began. Note that there was no presentation of the list on the second day. lowed by the 15 associates to sleep, followed by the 15 associates to needle. For random
Results and Discussion presentation, items from the three associative sets occurred randomly (in a fixed order)
Recall probabilities (both accurate and erroneous) are portrayed in Fig. 5 . Results from within the list. There were no demarcations between associative sets within lists, and sub-the first day of the experiment (the multitrial learning session) are discussed first, followed jects were not informed about the relations of words within the lists in either condition.
by an examination of the final recall test given a day later. Finally, conditional recall probaLists were recorded digitally in stereo using a 22,050-Hz sampling rate and 16-bit resolu-bilities are considered.
Day 1. An overall ANOVA indicated that tion. Words occurred at the approximate rate of 1 word per second, and they were presented there was no reliable three-way interaction among item type (studied, critical), study orvia LabTec CS 1400 stereo speakers. Subjects were provided with 8 1 2 Љ 1 11Љ sheets of paper der (blocked, random), and test number, F(4,152) õ 1. Therefore, separate two-way on which to record their responses.
analyses were performed for studied items and Procedure. Subjects were tested in groups critical items to examine the effects of study of four or fewer. They were told that they order and test number. were participating in an experiment designed STUDIED ITEMS. Initial observations of the to examine their ability to learn lists of words.
top two curves in the figure suggest that the It was explained that they would hear a list predicted pattern of effects occurred for studof 45 words presented on computer speakers, ied items: Recall increased across trials, demthe list would be presented five times, and each presentation would be followed by a re-onstrating learning of the list, and perfor- mance was generally better in the blocked random condition. Nevertheless, recall of the critical items was clearly not eliminated, as condition than in the random condition. However, ceiling effects may have masked the subjects produced substantial levels of false recall, even after hearing five presentations of blocked/random effect on the last couple of trials. the list. A 2 (ordering) 1 5 (trial) mixed ANOVA A 2 (ordering) 1 5 (test session) mixed ANOVA on the proportions correct was con-on the proportions generally confirmed these observations. There was a significant main efsistent with these observations. A main effect for test session was found , F(4,152) dering exerts an effect on false recall is inconclusive if one considers this experiment alone. CRITICAL ITEMS. There were two main questions with respect to critical items in this ex-However, Toglia and his colleagues have recently reported a reliable effect of this variable periment: (1) To what extent would production levels of critical items decrease across in the same paradigm, both on an immediate test (Toglia, Neuschatz, Goodwin, & Lyon, trials? and (2) Would there be a blocked/random effect? An examination of Fig. 5 suggests 1995a ) and after a 1-week delay (Toglia, Neuschatz, Goodwin, & Lyon, 1995b) . Therethat the probability of false recall was greater in the blocked condition than in the random fore, given the findings of Toglia et al. (1995a Toglia et al. ( , 1995b , combined with the marginally reliable condition. False recall also diminished across trials, with proportion of intrusions dropping effect obtained here, it seems safe to conclude that greater false recall occurs after blocked between Trials 1 and 5 from .57 to .32 for the blocked condition and from .30 to .20 for the than after random conditions. Finally, it is interesting to note that on the underlie these data, I examined new intrusions on each test trial. Shown in Fig. 6 are the first trial in the blocked condition, the proportion of critical nonpresented items recalled overall false recall levels for the blocked and random conditions (repeated from Fig. 5 ), (.57) greatly exceeded the proportion of studied items recalled (.38), t(19) Å 2.39, SEM Å along with the accompanying proportions of new intrusions recalled on each trial. ''New'' .079. By Trial 3, however, this pattern had reversed, showing a reliable advantage for intrusions were defined as those that had not appeared on any previous test trial. It is evistudied items, t(19) Å 2.8, SEM Å .089.
Day 2. The data points at the far right side dent from this graph that with the exception of the second trial, subjects rarely introduced of Fig. 5 represent performance on the final free recall test, which occurred 1 day later in new intrusions into their protocols; the learning curves are not being artificially inflated by the absence of an intervening study opportunity. These data suggest that recall of studied new intrusions occurring in later trials. Therefore, the conclusion that subjects have diffiitems decreased after 1 day (i.e., items were forgotten), whereas intrusion of critical non-culty correcting their errors seems firmly grounded. presented items increased after 1 day. Paired t tests confirmed these observations. For studIn summary, results of Experiment 2 demonstrated that when given repeated opportuniied items, the drop in recall levels between Trial 5 of Day 1 (.84) and Day 2 (.80) was ties to hear the study list, subjects could reduce the proportion of critical nonpresented reliable, t(39) Å 2.81, SEM Å .012. Conversely, the level of false recall rose between items recalled. However, they did not eliminate these errors. An analysis of conditionalTrials 5 (.26) and Day 2 (.33) after 1 day, t(39) Å 2.08, SEM Å .032.
ized recall probabilities showed that this latter finding was primarily attributable to subjects' An examination of noncritical intrusions showed that subjects rarely made such errors. carrying over their initial errors onto later tests, and not to the introduction of new intruCollapsing across trial number and study order, the mean number of noncritical intrusions sions. was .49 items per subject. Thus, subjects were GENERAL DISCUSSION not simply guessing when instructed to recall the lists.
Several noteworthy results were obtained in the two experiments reported here. First, I Conditionalized recall probabilities. The data for the critical items in this experiment obtained high levels of false recall following presentation of lists of associated words, are interesting in part because subjects had difficulty correcting their errors despite re-thereby replicating the findings of Deese (1959) and Roediger and McDermott (1995) peated opportunities to do so. However, given the data reported thus far, an alternative inter-(see also Payne et al., 1996; Read, 1996; and Schacter et al., 1996) . The intrusions were obpretation exists; that is, perhaps subjects successfully edited out their initial intrusions on tained despite an explicit warning to subjects against guessing. Second, and more interestthe first few trials, but new errors arose later in the session. Recall that each subject received a ingly, the high levels of false recall were maintained over a short delay (30 s) and relist centered around three critical items. Suppose subjects generally recalled two of these mained strong 2 days later. Indeed, after 2 days, the probability of false recall of critical items on Trial 1 and (say) by Trial 3 had learned not to include these two but then be-nonpresented items exceeded the probability of recall of list items in Experiment 1. Third, gan to (erroneously) recall the third critical item. This scenario (or a similar one) would both accurate recall and false recall were increased on a final free recall test by prior testproduce the obtained pattern of results.
To determine whether such a pattern might ing of the list 2 days earlier. Fourth, in a FIG. 6 . Overall probability of recall of critical nonpresented items (dashed lines) and the probability of recalling ''new'' critical items as a function of test trial and presentation order. multitrial learning paradigm, recall of the criti-items (see Experiment 2 reported here; Toglia cal item dropped over trials but stabilized at et al., 1995a, 1995b) . In addition, Toglia et 20 or 32% (depending on condition), indicat-al. (1995a) varied level of processing during ing that subjects did not completely edit the encoding and showed that false recall (like erroneous responses even after five study/test correct recall) occurs more frequently after cycles. An examination of conditionalized re-deep, semantic processing (a pleasantness ratcall probabilities of the intrusions confirmed ing task) than after shallow, graphemic prothis claim. Fifth, blocked presentation en-cessing (determining whether each word conhanced accurate recall relative to random pre-tained an ''a''). Both manipulations of list sentation; the finding for critical items was structure (blocked/random) and level of proless clear-cut, as the blocked/random differ-cessing (graphemic, semantic) show that enence fell short of the criterion for significance. coding factors affect later probability of false However, given that Toglia et al. (1995a, recall. Perhaps it is not too surprising that se1995b) obtained a robust blocked/random dif-mantic analysis of meaningfully related words ference in a similar paradigm, the effect for enhances false recall relative to graphemic critical items likely parallels the effect for analysis. More surprising is the outcome that studied items.
blocked presentation leads to greater false reThe present results speak to several issues call than does random presentation. As menin the development and maintenance of false tioned in the lead-in to Experiment 2, one memories. I discuss in turn how these results might hypothesize that repeated blocked prebear on three issues: (1) encoding factors that sentation as in Experiment 2 would cause subencourage development of false memories; (2) jects to identify the nature of the list and more the critical role of retrieval factors in enhanc-easily discern that a particular item they were ing false memories; and (3) the persistence of expecting to hear had not occurred in the list. the illusory memories created in this para-However, this did not happen. It would be digm.
interesting to see if the same pattern would Encoding Factors occur if subjects received simultaneous visual presentation of the list, which would make Blocked presentation enhances recall of both correct items and critical nonpresented the list structure more readily apparent (e.g., Elmes, Roediger, Wilkinson, & Greener, posed by Underwood (1965) . However, other results indicate that encoding factors are only 1972). Roediger and McDermott (1995) noted that partly responsible for these effects. Retrieval factors, considered next, also play a large role. the earliest idea used to explain false recognition in Underwood's (1965) 
paradigm also
Retrieval Factors provides a workable account of the more recent findings. Underwood (1965) proposed
The study of the effect of taking an initial test on performance on a later test has a long that an implicit associative response occurring during encoding (see or hear thread, and then history (e.g., Ballard, 1913; Spitzer, 1939) .
One general finding is that repeated testing think needle) could explain why subjects would later falsely recognize needle as having can lead to greater overall recall of the target material under certain conditions, a finding occurred in the list. In the paradigm used here, subjects hear 15 words derived from a com-called hypermnesia (Erdelyi & Becker, 1974;  see Payne, 1987 , for a review). A second conmon nonpresented word. The nonpresented word is in turn an associate of many of the sistent finding is the testing effect: taking a test leads to greater recall or recognition on a list words and therefore may be activated during list presentation. If the activation results later test than found in a control condition in which no first test is given (e.g., Spitzer, 1939; in conscious awareness of the nonpresented word, then this might explain why, when Wheeler & Roediger, 1992) . However, the effect of testing can also have deleterious conseTulving's (1985) remember/know procedure is used, subjects claim to remember the occur-quences on later recall, as seen in these experiments (see too Schooler, Foster, & Loftus, rence of the critical nonpresented words (Roediger & McDermott, 1995, Experiment 2; 1988; Payne et al., 1996, Experiment 2) . That is, the testing effect exists for false recall as Payne et al., 1996; Schacter et al., 1996) . The difficulty would resemble that of reality moni-well as for accurate recall; the present experiments show that taking a first test enhances toring, or internal source monitoring (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & later false recall just as it does veridical recall (see Fig. 3 ). The act of recall presumably proLindsay, 1993) , in which subjects must judge whether events they recognize were encoun-vides retrieval practice for recalled items and makes them more accessible on a later test. tered externally or were internally generated. As Johnson and her colleagues have demon-Indeed, many experiments have shown that recall of events produces greater facilitation strated, subjects often confuse imagined events with experienced events (Johnson, on a later test than does the actual re-presentation of the events (Hogan & Kintsch, 1971; .
These newer results can also be interpreted Thompson, Wenger, & Bartling, 1978) . The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate within this framework: If the associated items are presented together at study, then the con-that the same facilitation occurs for false recall as for accurate recall (see Roediger, Jacoby, text may make each presented item more likely to arouse the common associate than if and McDermott (1996) for further evidence on this point). The impact of initial testing on the relevant items are dispersed throughout the list. Similarly, semantic analysis of list items a later recognition test, however, is less clearcut. Roediger and McDermott (1995, Experiwould be more likely to lead to activation of links among associates than would shallower, ment 2) found testing effects for studied items and critical nonpresented items on a recognigraphemic analysis. Although the investigation into how study manipulations affect this tion test. However, using the same general paradigm, Schacter et al. (1996) failed to find memory illusion is just beginning, the present results and those of Toglia et al. (1995a, a testing effect for studied items or critical items. In addition, in an experiment that was 1995b) fit comfortably into the ideas first pro-essentially a replication of Roediger and Mc-judge whether each item they had written actually had been presented on the list, subjects Dermott's (1995) Experiment 2, Payne et al. (1996) failed to find a testing effect for critical in the forced recall condition often claimed to recognize their intrusions as having been items, although the effect was present for studied items. The reason for the discrepant find-studied, whereas subjects in the free recall condition did not show this effect. Thus, the ings within the recognition tests is unclear, but perhaps it is not too surprising that a test-process of generating responses can potentially create memories for the presentation of ing effect for false memories is easier to obtain on a free recall test than a recognition test. these items. Relatedly, Hyman, Husband, and Billings (1995) reported experiments showing This idea is based on the observation that for veridical recall, testing effects are robust on that repeatedly thinking about whether a nonoccurring childhood event had happened inrecall tests but difficult to obtain on recognition (see Roediger & Guynn, in press ). The creased the likelihood that subjects believed that it actually had happened (see too Hycrucial point in the current experiments, though, is that in the paradigm used here, ini-man & Pentland, 1996) . These findings converge on the results reported here in demontial testing affects later false recall in much the same way that it enhances veridical recall. strating that the act of retrieval affects not only veridical retention but also false recall. An interesting finding emerged in Experiment 2 from a comparison of the last recall Research in this area is new, but it seems likely from these first experiments that retrial on Day 1 and the delayed test on Day 2. For both blocked and random conditions, trieval factors play a critical role in development and maintenance of false memories. subjects showed a drop in accurate recall but an absolute increase in false recall over time and repeated testing. This finding is reminis-Persistence cent of the outcome of Posner and Keele's
The experiments reported here demonstrate (1970) study of learning to classify dot patthat intrusions in free recall tests can be persisterns. Over delays subjects became less effitent across time and across multiple opportucient in classifying the actual patterns that had nities for subjects to realize their errors. In been presented but still retained the ability to Experiment 1 (as well as in the papers by quickly classify the prototype from which the Roediger and McDermott (1995) , Payne et al. patterns had been generated (see too Solso & Schacter et al. (1996) ), it was McCarthy, 1981; Spiro, 1980; and Sulin & shown that on an immediate recall test, probaDooling, 1974, for similar observations). The bility of recall of the critical nonpresented present finding, if confirmed by later work, item approximated the probability of recall of would show absolute increases in false recall items that had been presented in the middle over repeated testing, consistent with Bartportion of the list, or items usually thought to lett's (1932) anecdotal results and specularepresent retrieval from long-term memory. tions. Indeed, Payne et al. (1996) showed that After a 2-day delay, false recall probabilities false recall levels increased across three sucexceeded recall probabilities from all list posicessive tests in the paradigm used here.
tions except the first few (see Fig. 3 ). Thus, Other research also shows the importance the critical nonpresented items appear to have of retrieval in creating false memories. Roebeen retrieved from long-term memory much diger, Wheeler, and Rajaram (1993) reported like presented items and, curiously, the ''foran experiment in which subjects studied 60 getting'' of nonpresented events seems to items and then were given either a free recall have occurred more slowly than for events test, or they were forced to guess on an initial that did occur. Indeed, in Experiment 2, the test (i.e., to produce 60 items that plausibly could have been presented). When asked to probability of false recall increased over a 1-day delay, whereas the probability of recall of Hasher, 1983; Hasher & Griffin, 1978; Johnson et al., 1993) . list items decreased.
Experiment 2 was designed to examine diFinally, an interesting puzzle arises from examining the results of the current experiments rectly the persistence of memory illusions as obtained in this paradigm by providing sub-and some prior experiments; the puzzle concerns the relation between false recall and accurate jects with multiple study (and test) opportunities. Although subjects were able to decrease recall in this paradigm. Under certain conditions, false recall levels vary in the same manner as the number of false recalls across trials, they were not able to eliminate them completely. accurate recall levels, whereas under other conditions, false recall levels vary inversely with In the blocked condition, the probability of false recall greatly exceeded that of veridical accurate recall. For example, enhancing accurate recall sometimes enhances false recall levels, as recall on the first trial, but by the second trial, this pattern disappeared. In both blocked and seen in (1) the effect of prior testing, (2) the benefit of semantic processing (relative to grarandom conditions, recall of list items appeared to be near asymptote by Trials 4 and phemic processing) during encoding, and (3) the benefit of blocked presentation (relative to ran-5, but the false recall probability did not drop below .32 and .20, respectively. Of course, dom presentation). In all three cases, variables increasing the probability of accurate recall also whether additional study/test trials would cause the drop to continue remains to be seen, increase that of false recall. However, under other conditions, variables enhancing accurate but clearly the illusion persists under the conditions used in Experiment 2 here.
recall reduce false recall. For example, in the multitrial free recall paradigm of Experiment 2, Perhaps one reason that false recall was not eliminated in Experiment 2 is that the repeated as subjects learned the items in the lists, they also decreased their levels of false recall. Fitesting aspect of the procedure somewhat counteracted the effect of repeated study pre-nally, a third pattern shows decreases in accurate recall can be accompanied by enhanced false sentations. That is, if recall tests serve to enhance procedures used in retrieval for both recall. This pattern is demonstrated in Experiment 2, in which the probability of accurate false and accurate recall, subjects might not have been able to effectively use the subse-recall dropped from Trial 5 on Day 1 to a later test on Day 2, whereas the probability of false quent study presentations to eliminate errors. If subjects received only repeated study pre-recall rose between the two tests. Perhaps under conditions in which accurate and false recall sentations (without intervening tests) they may be more likely to edit their responses vary together, the benefit shown in accurate recall might be a result of constructive processing. than in the customary study/test procedure.
That is, the same processes that enhance veridiExperiments are currently underway to examcal recall also drive up false recall. Resolution ine this issue.
of when the various patterns are observed must await future research. CONCLUDING REMARKS REFERENCES In conclusion, the experiments reported here 
